Life and Work Franz Brentano was born on January 16, in Marienberg am Rhein, Germany, a descendent of a strongly religious German-Italian family of intellectuals his uncle Clemens Brentano and his aunt Bettina von Arnim were among the most important writers of German Romanticism and his brother Lujo Brentano became a leading expert in social economics.
It will be convenient to divide the material covered by Brentano in chapter 7 of this work and the final section of chapter 6 into four parts.
The first part tries to establish the fundamental difference between judgements Urteile and presentations Vorstellungen ; the second part pertains to the relation between judgement and truth; the third part deals with existential judgements and their intentional objects; and the fourth part proposes a reduction of categorical and hypothetical judgements to the existential form.
Judgements Versus Presentations As a philosopher of mind, Brentano takes it to be his task to develop specific accounts of whatever phenomena one finds in inner Brentanos thesis. Applying this method to the case of judgement, Brentano arrives at the claim that judgements are clearly distinguishable from presentations.
The question that concerns him is how precisely they differ. Brentano invokes three negative claims to draw that distinction: That suffices to make claim 1 plausible. Claim 1 is compatible with the view that judging always means to hold true a proposition. For Brentano, that is not the right way to understand claim 1 however.
In order to rule out that interpretation, Brentano invokes the following pair of claims: Together, claims 2 and 3 imply that judgements can be made without judging a sentence or proposition to be true. That is what Brentano tries to establish. Let us see how he tries to achieve this goal.
Brentano considers three possible ways of conceiving of the difference between presentations and judgements. There may be i an intrinsic difference between them, ii they may differ in their objects, or iii in a perfection [Vollkommenheit] with which these objects are thought PES[II 42f.
What would it mean that the distinction between judgement and presentation is not intrinsic, i. It would mean that the distinction between judgement and presentation consists in a relational property that one of these mental phenomena has while the other lacks it. In this sense the distinction between a bachelor and a husband is extrinsic: Nothing else distinguishes bachelors and husbands from each other: Is the distinction between judgement and presentation like the distinction between husbands and bachelors?
According to Alexander Bain, it is. For Bain there are two kinds of ideas presentations: The former are judgements and beliefs, the latter are mere presentations see Bain In general, a dispositional property like disposing one to act on an object is grounded in its categorical properties.
Hence, the belief-constituting disposition to act must be grounded in categorical properties of ideas and these properties seem to be intrinsic.
Is the intrinsic difference between judgement and presentation one that concerns the objects presented? Is a judgement a mental phenomenon in which a connection between different features is thought, while a presentation does not apprehend a relation between one or more features cf.
His argument is based on considerations about existential judgements which we will discuss in detail below in part III. In essence, the argument is that the existential judgement that A is and a presentation of A have the same object: Is the intrinsic difference between judgement and presentation one that concerns a perfection in which mental phenomena that have the same object differ?
Brentano identifies the perfection as strength, intensity or vivacity of the mental phenomena concerned. A strong presentation is no judgement.Editor: Dr. Rochus Sowa ROCHUS SOWA (*) was assistant at the Husserl Archives in Leuven (Belgium) from until In he received the Edmund Husserl prize of the University of Freiburg for his master thesis on Husserl (“Wesen und Wortbedeutung”).
These three claims form the core of Brentano's theory of judgement: The foundational thesis (1) concerns the relation between judgement and predication, the polarity thesis (2) determines the place of negation in judgements, and the existential thesis (3) determines a canonical form in which all judgements can be expressed.
Of course, these. Description. Overview of Phenomenology is definitely an superb and comprehensive self-self-help guide to phenomenology. Dermot Moran lucidly examines the contributions of phenomenologys nine seminal thinkers: Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty .
“Brentano’s intentionality thesis” or simply “Brentano’s thesis.” 2 Brentano’s thesis has proven to be an extremely suggestive and fruitful source for the later researches of both analytic philosophers and phenomenologists.
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Understanding and Assessing “Brentano’s Thesis” in Light of His Modification of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality I Introduction Though the language of ‘intentional act’, ‘intentional object’ and ‘inten-tional indwelling’ is of medieval-scholastic origin, the contemporary view.